Response to imported case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever, the Netherland. by Timen, A. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/81664
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
On July 10, 2008, Marburg hemorrhagic fever was con-
firmed in a Dutch patient who had vacationed recently in 
Uganda. Exposure most likely occurred in the Python Cave 
(Maramagambo Forest), which harbors bat species that 
elsewhere in Africa have been found positive for Marburg 
virus. A multidisciplinary response team was convened to 
perform a structured risk assessment, perform risk classi-
fication of contacts, issue guidelines for follow-up, provide 
information, and monitor the crisis response. In total, 130 
contacts were identified (66 classified as high risk and 64 
as low risk) and monitored for 21 days after their last pos-
sible exposure. The case raised questions specific to inter-
national travel, postexposure prophylaxis for Marburg virus, 
and laboratory testing of contacts with fever. We present 
lessons learned and results of the follow-up serosurvey of 
contacts and focus on factors that prevented overreaction 
during an event with a high public health impact.
In Western countries, Marburg hemorrhagic fever (MHF) is an imported disease with a low risk of occurrence, but 
it has a high profile in the public mind (1) because it can 
be transmitted from person to person, the course is fatal 
in up to 80% of cases, and the reservoir is uncertain (2,3). 
The infection is caused by the Marburg virus (MARV), an 
enveloped, nonsegmented, negative-stranded RNA virus 
belonging, with the Ebola virus, to the family Filoviridae. 
Although the main transmission route is direct contact with 
blood or other infected body fluids, transmission by drop-
lets and aerosols cannot be ruled out and has been demon-
strated in animal models (4).
MARV was identified in 1967 in Marburg, Germany, 
during a laboratory outbreak caused by handling tissues of 
African green monkeys (5,6). From 1975 through 1987, 
sporadic cases occurred in South Africa (1975, when the 
index case, a person exposed in Zimbabwe, was diagnosed 
in South Africa) (7) and in Kenya (1980, 1987) (8–10). 
Outbreaks were reported from the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in 1998–2000 (11,12), Angola in 2004–2005 (2) 
and Uganda in 2007 (13). Nonhuman primates and bats 
are suspected as sources of infection, but their role in the 
natural reservoir for MARV and transmission to humans is 
unclear (14).
In July 2008, an imported case of MHF was diagnosed 
in the Netherlands. We describe the public health response 
involving the management of 130 contacts at risk of acquir-
ing the disease.
The Case
On July 5, 2008, a 41-year-old woman was referred by 
her general practitioner to the Elkerliek Hospital because of 
fever (39°C) and chills of 3 days’ duration after returning 
from a June 5–28 holiday in Uganda. She was placed in a 
hospital room with 3 other patients. Malaria was ruled out 
by 3 negative blood films. Routine bacteriologic tests were 
performed, and empiric treatment with ceftriaxone, 2 g/day, 
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was started. On July 7, hemorrhagic fever was included 
among other infectious causes in the differential diagnosis 
because of rapid clinical deterioration and impending liver 
failure. An ambulance stripped of all unnecessary devices 
and equipped in accordance with strict isolation protocols 
transferred the patient to a single room with negative air 
pressure ventilation and anteroom in the Leiden University 
Medical Centre (LUMC).
After admission, rash, conjunctivitis, diarrhea, liver 
and kidney failure, and finally, hemorrhaging developed in 
the patient. Extensive bacteriologic and virologic analyses 
were conducted, and plasma samples were sent to Dutch 
national laboratories and to the Bernhard-Nocht-Institute 
for Tropical Medicine (BNI) in Hamburg, Germany, for 
testing to detect antibodies to and RNA from filoviruses. 
Initial laboratory results from the Dutch national reference 
laboratory were ambiguous for hemorrhagic fever. On July 
10, BNI reported a positive reverse transcription–PCR re-
sult for MARV (15), which was confirmed by sequence 
analysis of the polymerase gene. The strain was related to, 
but distinct from, known isolates. MARV was confirmed 
by PCR by the Department of Virology at Erasmus Medi-
cal College (Rotterdam, the Netherlands). On July 11, the 
patient died of consequences of cerebral edema.
Travel History and Hypotheses 
for the Source of Infection
The patient’s travel group consisted of 7 Dutch tourists 
and 2 guides. Three of the tourists, including the patient, 
and 1 guide visited an empty cave on June 16 in Fort Portal 
and the Python Cave in the Maramagambo Forest on June 
19. The patient’s partner recalled bats flying around in the 
latter cave, bumping against the visitors, and large amounts 
of droppings on the ground. She incurred no bite wounds, 
and no preexisting wounds were exposed to bats. On July 
23, the travel group came within 5 m of gorillas in the wild 
and visited a village inhabited by pygmies, where they saw 
an elderly sick woman lying under a blanket.
We postulated that the most probable source of MARV 
infection was the visit to the Python Cave, known for its 
colony of Egyptian fruit-eating bats (Rousettus aegyptia-
cus). The party had photographed these bats, and this spe-
cies of bat has been shown to carry filoviruses, including 
MARV (16,17) in other sub-Saharan locations. We esti-
mated the incubation period of the infection to be 13 days.
Organization of Public Health Response
On July 8, the attending physician at the LUMC noti-
fied the Dutch public health authorities about the case. A 
national outbreak response team was formed of clinicians, 
medical microbiologists and virologists, public health spe-
cialists, staff members from the national response unit, and 
a press officer. This team convened a nearly daily telecon-
ference to 1) to perform a structured assessment of the pub-
lic health risks in the 2 hospitals and in the community, 2) 
perform risk classification of contacts, 3) issue guidelines 
for follow-up, 4) provide information to professionals and 
media, and 5) monitor progression of crisis response.
Immediately after the diagnosis was confirmed, on 
July 10, a press conference was held. Various press state-
ments emphasizing the control measures designed to pre-
vent secondary transmission followed the press conference. 
The World Health Organization was notified according to 
the International Health Regulations by the National Fo-
cal Point, and international warnings were issued through 
the Early Warning and Response System and through 
ProMED.
Management of Contacts
Although MARV infectivity is highest in the last stage 
of the disease, when severe bleeding coincides with high 
viral load, we considered the onset of fever (July 2) as the 
starting point for contact monitoring. Follow-up measures 
tailored to the risk group were undertaken during the 21 
days after last possible exposure (14,18,19). The high-risk 
group comprised anyone with unprotected exposure of skin 
or mucosa to blood or other body fluids of the index pa-
tient. It included the other 3 patients in the patient’s room 
at Elkerliek and personnel who handled her specimens 
without protection. The low-risk contacts were LUMC and 
ambulance personnel who had employed the appropriate 
personal protective measures while caring for the patient or 
diagnostic samples. Persons who had been near the patient 
during her holiday, the return flight, and stay in the Nether-
lands until Elkerliek admission but who were not exposed 
to her body fluids during her febrile illness and personnel 
from reference laboratories who worked under BioSafety 
Level 3 conditions were categorized as casual contacts.
A total of 130 at-risk contacts were identified, 64 at 
high risk and 66 at low risk (Table). High-risk contacts 
were required to record their temperature 2×/day, report to 
the local health authorities 1×/day, and postpone any travel 
abroad. The low-risk contacts were asked to record their 
temperature 2×/day and to report to local health authori-
ties if it was >38°C. No limits were imposed on the casual 
contacts.
Because asymptomatic MARV infection is rare (20,21) 
and thus unlikely to play a role in spreading the infection, 
we restricted further clinical and laboratory evaluation to 
persons with a temperature >38°C, measured at 2 points 
12 hours apart. Every case of fever was to be assessed on 
an individual basis by the response team. Three academic 
hospitals provided stand-by isolation facilities for admis-
sion of contacts.
On August 1, the temperature monitoring of contacts 
ended. Fever of at least 12 hours’ duration or clinical signs 
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of MHF did not develop in any of the contacts. Fever within 
21 days did not develop in any of the travel companions and 
local guide who joined the patient in the bat cave. Because 
sustained fever did not develop in any of the high-risk or 
low-risk contacts during the surveillance period, no clinical 
or laboratory follow-up for MARV was needed. The online 
Technical Appendix (available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/15/8/1171-Techapp.pdf) summarizes other find-
ings during the monitoring period, dilemmas encountered 
with respect to travel restrictions, postexposure options in 
case of a high-risk accident, and laboratory diagnosis in the 
early stage of infection. The online Technical Appendix 
also describes laboratory procedures used.
Serologic Follow-up
To identify asymptomatic seroconversion, a serosur-
vey was undertaken of 85/130 (65%) contact persons who 
participated in the study. They represented 78% (50/64) of 
high-risk contacts and 53% (35/66) of low-risk contacts 
and included the Dutch visitors to the bat cave. Blood sam-
ples were collected from December 2008 through February 
2009, 5–7 months after possible exposure. The laboratory 
testing was performed at the BNI in Hamburg by using an 
immunofluorescent antibody (IFA) assay.
The IFA slides were prepared using the MARV strain 
of the index patient. Details about the laboratory testing are 
given in the online Technical Appendix. In 2 initial evalua-
tions, all but 2 samples were negative for antibodies against 
MARV. Additional screening found that all serum samples 
tested negative for immunoglobulin (Ig) G and IgM to 
MARV.
Discussion
We have described the public health response to the 
case of MHF in a Dutch woman returning from travel 
abroad, who was most likely exposed to MARV by visit-
ing a bat cave. Outbreaks caused by filoviruses constitute 
a serious public health threat in sub-Saharan countries and 
have disruptive consequences at the individual and societal 
level. In countries in which these viruses are not endemic, 
imported cases occur only sporadically and are associated 
with little or no secondary transmission (22). Our patient 
represents a rare case of MARV infection imported to a 
Western country, and her case is unusual in that her only 
likely exposure was visiting a bat cave while traveling in 
Uganda. Insectivorous bats may have been the source of 
sporadic cases in Zimbabwe in 1975 (23) and Kenya in 
1980 and 1987 (8,9). Furthermore, epidemiologic evidence 
linked a large outbreak of MHF in Durba (Democratic Re-
public of Congo) to a mine containing a large population 
of fruit-eating bats (24). Although the source of infection 
in our case is not certain, circumstantial evidence points to 
transmission in the Python Cave. Ecological surveys to as-
sess the presence of infected bats in that cave are ongoing 
(P. Rollin, pers. comm.).
Our case shows that unnoticed exposure to an unknown 
reservoir in a country with no apparent cases of MHF can 
lead to infection. In countries with previous cases of MHF, 
entry into bat caves should certainly be avoided until we 
know the role of bats as reservoir for MARV. The impor-
tance of MHF for western countries may be increasing, 
with more persons traveling to high-risk regions and incur-
ring exposure by intrusion into unaccustomed ecological 
niches. Hospital staff in low-risk countries must be alert 
to this possibility. In most travelers returning from tropi-
cal destinations, fevers are caused by common pathogens 
or by malaria. However, fever together with rapid clinical 
deterioration and hemorrhaging in a patient returned from 
a suspect region should suggest viral hemorrhagic fevers, 
especially if exposure to a possible reservoir could have 
occurred.
Inclusion of MHF in the differential diagnosis of a 
patient triggers an immediate public health response. This 
response aims primarily at reducing the chance of second-
ary transmission by identifying contact persons at risk. 
Person-to-person transmission occurs in countries to which 
MARV is endemic (22) but only once has been reported 
elsewhere (23). In this case we identified 130 contacts with 
possible risk. Two hospitals, 2 public health departments, 
and 3 laboratories were involved. We decided to trace all 
people who were in contact with the index patient after her 
fever developed and to assess their risk for exposure on a 
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Table. Control measures targeting contacts with risk for exposure to Marburg virus, the Netherlands, 2008* 
Measures
Type of contact 
Date of 
exposure, 
Jul
No.
persons
Risk for 
exposure
Temperature 
monitoring
2×/day  
Daily temperature 
reporting to health 
authorities
Asked to limit 
travel and to not 
leave the country 
Household/family contacts 2–8 4 High Yes Yes Yes 
Persons exposed in hospital ward 5–7 6 High Yes Yes Yes 
GP of the index case-patient 5 1 High Yes Yes Yes 
Healthcare workers, Elkerliek Hospital  7 33 High Yes Yes Yes 
Local laboratory workers  5–7 18 High Yes Yes Yes 
Ambulance staff 7 2 Low Yes No No
Health care workers,  LUMC 7–11 66 Low Yes No No
*GP, general practitioner; LUMC, Leiden University Medical Centre. 
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case-by-case basis. All contacts complied with temperature 
monitoring and daily reporting. All but 2 high-risk contacts 
postponed further travel until the theoretical incubation pe-
riod of 21 days had elapsed.
In the Netherlands, statutory power to prevent a healthy 
person from traveling abroad is limited, but the Public 
Health Law is being revised, and emergency legal provi-
sions are being considered. Despite various recommenda-
tions (14,18,25–27), no evidence-based, widely accepted 
international protocol is available to guide contact classi-
fication and monitoring in the case of MHF. Legislation 
on containment of dangerous pathogens (1) and measures 
applied to contacts differ among countries, sometimes with 
extreme consequences. These differences, together with 
privacy issues, make international exchange of information 
difficult.
The serosurvey of the contacts of this patient confirm 
that no secondary transmission took place between her and 
any contact who provided a blood sample. Our results are 
consistent with those of Borchert et al. (21), who found no 
serologic evidence for asymptomatic or mild MARV infec-
tion in a serosurvey of household contacts.
The present case was an exceptional situation in which 
visiting a tourist attraction led to MHF, a disease with a 
high potential for overreaction. Given this potential, a ra-
tional response must be built on a thorough and evidence-
based risk assessment (1). The response in the Netherlands 
was low profile and did not lead to overreacting or public 
alarm. Its key factors were a coordinated risk assessment 
and contact monitoring, together with factual updates for 
health professionals and the public. MHF may be more of-
ten encountered in industrialized countries in the future due 
to adventure travel to regions endemic for MHF.
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